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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the revenue model selection of 
app developers in a duopoly setting. Two developers 
offering vertically-differentiated apps can adopt either 
a pay-per-download or a freemium strategy. Under the 
pay-per-download strategy, consumers pay a fee to 
acquire the app. Under the freemium strategy, 
consumers are offered with a free basic version and 
can choose to pay an additional fee for the full version. 
A game theoretical model is used to analyze the 
competition in the presence of network effect and 
learning effect. We find that when the quality difference 
is moderate, the pay-per-download strategy is optimal 
for the high-quality app if the quality of basic version 
is low, otherwise freemium strategy is optimal. 
Responding to the pay-per-download strategy of the 
high-quality app, adopting the pay-per-download 
strategy is optimal for the low-quality app if quality of 
basic version is high, otherwise freemium strategy is 
adopted.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The comScore mobile report revealed that the 
number of mobile users surpassed desktop users in 
2014. Gartner also predicted that over 268 billion 
smartphone application (“app”) downloads would 
generate an income of $77 billion in 2017. The rising 
app downloads promise great potential for revenues. 
However the app market is extremely competitive and 
saturated. As of March 2017, there were 2.8 million 
available apps at Google Play Store and 2.2 billion 
apps available in the Apple’s App Store, the two 
leading app stores in the world. This number is 
expected to increase in the future. Thus the market 
calls for careful and thorough analyses of the app 
developers’ revenue models, especially in a 
competitive market.  
According to software analyst firm VisionMobile, 
commonly app revenue models include freemium, 
in-app-purchase, pay-per-download, subscription and 
advertising. Among them, freemium and 
pay-per-download are among the top in terms of 
revenue generation for the developers. Under 
Pay-per-download, users pay a fee to acquire the apps, 
while under the freemium model, users are offered 
with a free trial version of apps before deciding 
whether to purchase the full version. Table 1 and Table 
2 present a few examples of apps using the 
pay-per-download strategy and freemium strategy. 
 
Table 1. Examples of Pay-per-download Apps 
App Price Category 
Monument Valley 2 4.99 Games 
Enlight 3.99 Photo & Video 
HotSchedules 2.99 Business 
Toca Hair Salon 2.99 Education 
Dark Sky Weather 3.99 Weather 
 
Table 2. Examples of Freemium Apps 
App Price Category 
Geometry Dash Lite Free Games Geometry Dash 1.99 
Speak & Translate – Voice and 
Text Translator Free Reference Speak & Translate – Live Voice 
and Text Translator 19.99 
Live Wallpapers for Me – Free 
Moving Backgrounds Free Entertainm
ent Live Wallpapers for Me – 
Animated HD Backgrounds 1.99 
Planes Live Free – Flight Status 
Tracker & Radar Free Travel Planes Live – Flight Status 
Tracker & Radar 6.99 
Scanner for Me – Free PDF 
Scanner & Printer App Free Business Scanner for Me –PDF Scan with 
OCR for Documents 4.99 
 
Compared with the pay-per-download strategy, free 
trial under the freemium strategy affects app sales in 
several ways. First, offering two versions capture the 
network effect from both trial users and buyers. Due to 
a larger network, consumers have higher utilities, 
which may further increase consumer demand for the 
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paid version and bring more profit to the app developer. 
Second, the demand for the paid version can be 
cannibalized by that for the free version because some 
consumers may find it sufficient to use the free version 
only and choose not to buy the full version. Third, after 
trying the basic version, consumers revise their beliefs 
about the full version. If the quality of the basic version 
is much higher than consumers’ expectation, 
consumers raise their beliefs regarding the quality of 
the full version. For example, many game apps offer 
two versions to consumers, where the basic version 
provides some game stages for a free trial and the full 
version requires the users to pay to unlock the 
additional game stages. After trying the basic version, a 
user can tell whether she likes this kind of game or not. 
Due to the consistency in game design between the 
trial and full versions, the users can update the beliefs 
about the quality of the full version based on the 
experience of using the trials.   
Considering network effect and experience-based 
learning effect, we study the competition between two 
app developers who offer vertically-differentiated apps. 
Specifically, we examine how consumers’ expected 
quality and true quality of the two versions impact the 
developers’ strategy choices between 
pay-per-download strategy and freemium strategy in 
equilibrium. This paper takes the initiative to 
analytically model and compare the most common 
revenue models for app developers, aiming to examine 
the equilibrium of how mobile developers choose 
revenue models in reaction to users’ responses and 
competitors’ strategies. 
Our paper is related to the literature regarding free 
trial strategy of information products. The effect of free 
trial strategy was examined in empirical studies ([1], 
[8], [9]). Considering network effect, cannibalization 
effect and learning effect, the majority of extant studies 
([2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [11]) develop analytical 
model to examine limited version free trial, 
time-locked free trial, seeding strategies in a monopoly 
setting. Zhang et al. ([13]) studied freemium strategy in 
a duopoly setting, but they omitted the learning effect 
and derived conclusions by strictly assuming that the 
quality of the full version is identical among two firms. 
We consider network effect, cannibalization effect and 
learning effect to investigate the freemium strategy in a 
competition setting where the two app developers offer 
vertically-differentiated apps. Ma and Kauffman ([10]) 
investigated competition between software-as-a-service 
vendors by considering the sampling behavior of the 
clients. In their model, each client chooses one vendor 
for sampling and learns the exact value of the product 
after using it for a period of time. However, in the app 
market, the users are able to try all of the offered free 
versions before making the final decisions due to the 
negligible using cost, but they cannot get the exact 
value of the full version unless using it because of the 
difference of the functionality between the free version 
and the full version. The analysis based on our model 
provides insights for competition between app 
developers who consider adopting freemium strategy 
(offering limited-functionality version and 
full-functionality version) and pay-per-download 
strategy, where the learning effect, network effect and 
cannibalization effect are examined.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We 
introduce our general model framework in Section 2. 
The results are analyzed and discussed in Section 3. 
We finally conclude the paper in Section 4.  
 
2. Model 
 
We model competition between two app developers, 
who can adopt one of two strategies: (i) 
pay-per-download strategy, a strategy where consumers 
pay to get the app; (ii) freemium strategy, a strategy 
where the app developer offers the basic version for 
free and charges for the full version.  
The sequence of the game is as follows. In stage 1, 
the app developers simultaneously decide their 
strategies to adopt. In stag 2, after observing the 
opponent’s choice made in stage 1, the app developers 
announce the prices of their apps. In stage 3, 
consumers make purchase decisions based on their 
expected utilities. Specifically, when both app 
developers adopt the freemium strategy, each consumer 
tries both basic-version apps before making the final 
choice. Each consumer chooses to adopt an app from 
one of the developers, and decides the version if both 
versions are offered. Under the freemium strategy, 
before making the final purchase decision, consumers 
try the basic-version app and adjust their expected 
utilities toward the two versions according to the 
realized quality of the free version. 
A consumer’s expected utility is composed of two 
parts: the intrinsic valuation and the network-based 
valuation. The intrinsic valuation is determined by the 
quality preference of a consumer and the prior belief of 
the quality. ߠ௜  measures consumer ݅ ’s quality 
preference, which is uniformly distributed on the 
support of ሾ0,1ሿ. Let ௝ܽ and ௝ܾ ሺ݆ ൌ 1,2ሻ stand for 
the quality of the basic version and the full version of 
app ݆, respectively. We assume that consumers have 
consistent prior beliefs of the quality, and they do not 
know the true value of the quality until they purchase 
and experience the app. To capture uncertainty in the 
quality of the app prior to purchase, the quality of the 
basic version of app ݆ ( ௝ܽ) is randomly drawn from a 
distribution with mean ௝ܽ଴ and variance ߪ௔ೕଶ , whereas 
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the quality of full version of app ݆ ( ௝ܾ) is randomly 
drawn from a distribution with mean ௝ܾ଴ and variance 
ߪ௕ೕଶ . After trying the basic functionalities of the free 
version, consumers under freemium strategy know the 
actual value of ௝ܽ  and adjust their belief of the 
full-version quality, which could be computed with 
 Ε൫ ௝ܾห ௝ܽ൯ ൌ ௝ܾ଴ ൅ ߚ௝൫ ௝ܽ െ ௝ܽ଴൯,  (1) 
where the intensity of learning effect ߚ௝ ൌ ߩ௝
ఙ್ೕ
ఙೌೕ
 and 
ߩ௝ describe the coefficient of correlation between ௝ܽ 
and ௝ܾ. Therefore, consumer݅’s intrinsic valuation of 
app ݆ under pay-per-download strategy is ߠ௜ ௝ܾ଴. After 
trying the basic version under freemium strategy, 
consumer ݅’s intrinsic valuation of the basic version of 
app ݆  is ߠ௜ ௝ܽ , and that of the full version is 
ߠ௜Ε൫ ௝ܾห ௝ܽ൯ . Without loss of generality, we assume 
ܾଵ଴ ൏ ܾଶ଴  and ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ ൏ ܾଶ଴ ൅ߚଶሺܽଶ െ ܽଶ଴ሻ.  
Following Prasad et al. ([12]), we assume that the 
network-based valuations are linearly-increasing with 
the size of the user base and consumers have perfect 
foresight about equilibrium demand. Let ௝݁ denote the 
intensity of network effect of app ݆, which means the 
marginal utility that a consumer joins the network. 
Thus, the network-based valuation of app ݆  under 
pay-per-download strategy is ௝݁ ௝݀ , where ௝݀  stands 
for the demand of the app in equilibrium. The 
network-based valuation of app ݆  under freemium 
strategy is ௝݁ ቀ݀௔ೕ ൅ ݀௕ೕቁ , where ݀௔ೕ  and ݀௕ೕ  
represent the number of consumers paying nothing to 
use the basic version and the number of consumers 
purchasing the full version, respectively.  
Let ݌௝  stand for the price of app ݆  under 
pay-per-download strategy or the price of the full 
version of app ݆ under freemium strategy. When app 
developer ݆ adopts pay-per-download strategy, the net 
utility of consumer ݅ toward app ݆ is 
 ݑ௜௝௉ ൌ ߠ௜ ௝ܾ଴ ൅ ௝݁ ௝݀ െ ݌௝.  (2) 
App developer ݆ sets the price ݌௝  to maximize his 
profit, which could be calculated by  
 Π௝൫݌௝൯ ൌ ݌௝ ௝݀.  (3) 
When app developer ݆ adopts freemium strategy, 
after trying the basic version of the app, consumer ݅’s 
utility toward the free version is  
 ݑ௜௝ி௔ ൌ ߠ௜ ௝ܽ ൅ ௝݁ ቀ݀௔ೕ ൅ ݀௕ೕቁ,  (4) 
and her utility toward the full version is 
 ݑ௜௝ி௕ ൌ ߠ௜Ε൫ ௝ܾห ௝ܽ൯ ൅ ௝݁ ቀ݀௔ೕ ൅ ݀௕ೕቁ െ ݌௝.  (5) 
App developer ݆ sets the price ݌௝  to maximize his 
profit, which could be calculated by  
 Π௝൫݌௝൯ ൌ ݌௝݀௕ೕ.  (6) 
2.1 Case PP: Duopoly with Both App 
Developers Adopting Pay-Per-Download 
Strategy 
 
When two app developers both adopt 
pay-per-download strategy, each consumer chooses one 
of the two apps to maximize her utility. Thus, the 
market is divided into three segments, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
1 20 1
 
Figure 1. Consumer segmentation when both 
app developers adopt pay-per-download 
strategy 
 
Consumers with low ߠ  purchase nothing, and 
consumers with moderate ߠ  purchase app 1, and 
consumers with high ߠ purchase app 2. By setting 
ݑ௜ଵ௉ ൌ 0, we get the quality preference of the consumer 
who is indifferent regarding to purchase nothing or app 
1 
 ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௣భି௘భௗభ௕భబ .  (7) 
By setting ݑ௜ଵ௉ ൌ ݑ௜ଶ௉ , we get the quality preference 
of the consumer who is indifferent regarding to 
purchase app 1 or app 2 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௣మି௣భା௘భௗభି௘మௗమ௕మబି௕భబ .  (8) 
Based on above expressions of indifferent points, 
we have the following equations  
 ݀ଵ ൌ ௕భబሺ௣మି௘మௗమሻି௕మబሺ௣భି௘భௗభሻ௕భబሺ௕మబି௕భబሻ ,  (9) 
 ݀ଶ ൌ ௘మௗమି௘భௗభା௕మబି௕భబି௣మା௣భ௕మబି௕భబ , (10) 
and solve them to get the expressions of consumer 
demand. By substituting ݀ଵ  and ݀ଶ  into the profit 
function and solving the first order conditions of the 
profit functions, we find the equilibrium solutions of 
the sub-game Case PP.  
Proposition	 1.	 When	 ݌ଵ െ ݁ଵ݀ଵ ൐ 0 ,	 ݀ଵ ൐ 0 ,	
ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ െ ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଵ ൅ ݁ଶ݀ଶ െ ݁ଵ݀ଵ ൐ 0，2ሺ݁ଵ െ ܾଵ଴ሻ/ሺܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ ݁ଵܾଶ଴ െ ݁ଶܾଵ଴ ൅ ݁ଵ݁ଶሻ ൏ 0 ,	2ሺ݁ଶ െ ܾଶ଴ሻ/ሺܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ ݁ଵܾଶ଴ െ ݁ଶܾଵ଴ ൅݁ଵ݁ଶሻ ൏ 0 ,	 the	 prices	 in	 equilibrium	 are	 	݌ଵ ൌ
൫ܾଵ଴ሺܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ ݁ଵܾଶ଴ െ 2݁ଶܾଵ଴ ൅ 2݁ଵ݁ଶሻ൯/
ሺ4ܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ 4݁ଶܾଵ଴ െ 4݁ଵܾଶ଴ ൅ 4݁ଵ݁ଶሻ ,	݌ଶ ൌ ሺ2ܾଶ଴ଶ ܾଵ଴ െ 2ܾଵ଴ଶ ܾଶ଴ െ 2݁ଶܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ ൅ ݁ଶܾଵ଴ଶ െ2݁ଵܾଶ଴ଶ ൅ 2݁ଵ݁ଶܾଶ଴ሻ/ሺ4ܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ 4݁ଶܾଵ଴ െ4݁ଵܾଶ଴ ൅ 4݁ଵ݁ଶሻ ,	 the	 consumer	 demands	 in	
equilibrium	 are	 ݀ଵ ൌ ሺ݁ଶ݌ଵ െ ݁ଶܾଵ଴ ൅ ܾଵ଴݌ଶ െܾଶ଴݌ଵሻ/ሺܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ ݁ଵܾଶ଴ െ ݁ଶܾଵ଴ ൅ ݁ଵ݁ଶሻ , ݀ଶ ൌሺܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ ݁ଵܾଶ଴ ൅ ݁ଵ݌ଶ െ ܾଵ଴݌ଶ ൅ ܾଵ଴݌ଵሻ/ሺܾଵ଴ܾଶ଴ െ ܾଵ଴ଶ െ ݁ଵܾଶ଴ െ ݁ଶܾଵ଴ ൅ ݁ଵ݁ଶሻ.	 	
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2.2 Case PF/FP: Duopoly with One App 
Developer Adopting Pay-Per-Download 
Strategy and One App Developer Adopting 
Freemium Strategy 
 
When app developer 1 adopts freemium strategy 
and app developer 2 adopts pay-per-download strategy, 
there are two cases of consumer segmentation, which 
are illustrated in Figure 2.  
1 20 1
	
(a) Case 1: ൜ܽଵ ൏ ܾଶ଴ ൏ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ 1  
1 20 1
	
(b) Case 2: ൜ܽଵ ൏ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ ൏ ܾଶ଴0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ 1  
Figure 2. Consumer segmentation when app 
developer 1 adopts freemium strategy and app 
developer 2 adopts pay-per-download strategy 
 
In case 1 where ܽଵ ൏ ܾଶ଴ ൏ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ, 
after trying the basic version of app 1, consumers’ 
expected quality of app 2 is lower than their expected 
quality of full version of app 1. Consumers with low ߠ 
use basic version of app 1 for free, and consumers with 
moderate ߠ purchase app 2, and consumers with high 
ߠ purchase full version of app 1. By setting ݑ௜ଵி௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଶ௉  
and ݑ௜ଶ௉ ൌ ݑ௜ଵி௕ , we get the expressions of the 
indifferent points as 
 ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௣భఉభ௔భିఉభ௔భబି௔భା௕భబ.  (11) 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௘మௗమି௘భௗೌభି௘భௗ್భା௣భି௣మఉభ௔భିఉభ௔భబା௕భబି௕మబ .  (12) 
In case 2 where ܽଵ ൏ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ ൏ ܾଶ଴ , 
after trying the basic version of app 1, consumers’ 
expected quality of app 2 is higher than their expected 
quality of full version of app 1. Thus, consumers with 
low ߠ  use basic version of app 1 for free, and 
consumers with moderate ߠ purchase full version of 
app 1, and consumers with high ߠ purchase app 2. By 
setting ݑ௜ଵூ௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଵூ௕  and ݑ௜ଵூ௕ ൌ ݑ௜ଶ௉ , the indifferent 
points could be computed by 
 ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௘మௗమି௘భௗೌభି௘భௗ್భି௣మ௔భି௕మబ .  (13) 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௘మௗమି௘భௗೌభି௘భௗ್భା௣భି௣మఉభ௔భିఉభ௔భబା௕భబି௕మబ .  (14) 
Based on the above expressions of indifferent 
points, we derive the expressions of consumer demand 
and further find the equilibrium solutions for the 
competition game when two app developers adopt 
different strategies. Due to the limitation of the space, 
we omit the specific expressions of prices, consumer 
demand and profit in equilibrium as well as 
corresponding conditions in subgame Case FP. When 
app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download strategy and 
app developer 2 adopts freemium strategy, the 
equilibrium of the subgame Case PF could be derived 
in a similar way.  
	
2.3 Case FF: Duopoly with Both App 
Developers Adopting Freemium Strategy 
 
When two app developers both adopt freemium 
strategy, consumers have four choices after trying basic 
versions of two apps. Four cases of consumer 
segmentation are illustrated in Figure 3.  
1 20 1
 
(a) Case 1: 
ቐ
ܽଵ ൏ ܽଶ ൏ ଵܾ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ
݁ଵ݀௕ଵ ൏ ݁ଶሺ݀௔ଶ ൅ ݀௕ଶሻ
0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ 1
 or ቐ
ܽଶ ൏ ܽଵ ൏ ଵܾ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ
ݑ௜ଵூ௔൫ߠ෨ଵ൯ ൏ ݑ௜ଶூ௔൫ߠ෨ଵ൯
0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ 1
 
1 20 1
	
(b) Case 2:  
ቐ
ܽଶ ൏ ܽଵ ൏ ଵܾ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ
݁ଶ݀௕ଶ ൏ ݁ଵሺ݀௔ଵ ൅ ݀௕ଵሻ
0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ 1
or ቐ
ܽଵ ൏ ܽଶ ൏ ଵܾ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ
ݑ௜ଶூ௔൫ߠ෨ଵ൯ ൏ ݑ௜ଵூ௔൫ߠ෨ଵ൯
0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ 1
 
1 30 12
 
(c) Case 3:൜ܽଵ ൏ ܽଶ ൏ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ ߠ෨ଷ ൏ 1   
1 30 12
 
(d) Case 4: ൜ܽଶ ൏ ܽଵ ൏ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܽଵ െ ܽଵ଴ሻ0 ൏ ߠ෨ଵ ൏ ߠ෨ଶ ൏ ߠ෨ଷ ൏ 1  
Figure 3. Consumer segmentation when both 
app developers adopt freemium strategy 
 
In Case 1, no consumers only use basic version of 
app 1. Consumers with low ߠ use basic version of app 
2 for free, and consumers with moderate ߠ purchase 
full version of app 1, and consumers with high ߠ 
purchase full version of app 2. By setting ݑ௜ଶி௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଵி௕ 
and ݑ௜ଵி௕ ൌ ݑ௜ଶி௕ , the indifferent points could be 
computed by 
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	 ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௘మௗೌమା௘మௗ್మି௘భௗ್భା௣భఉభ௔భିఉభ௔భబି௔మା௕భబ ,  (15) 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௘మௗೌమା௘మௗ್మି௘భௗ್భା௣భି௣మఉభ௔భିఉమ௔మିఉభ௔భబାఉమ௔మబା௕భబି௕మబ.  (16) 
In Case 2, no consumers use basic version of app 2 
only. Consumers with low ߠ use basic version of app 
1 for free, and consumers with moderate-to-high ߠ 
purchase full versions of two apps. By setting 
ݑ௜ଵி௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଵி௕  and ݑ௜ଵி௕ ൌ ݑ௜ଶி௕ , we get the indifferent 
points as 
 ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௣భఉభ௔భିఉభ௔భబି௔భା௕భబ,  (17) 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௘మௗ್మି௘భௗೌభି௘భௗ್భା௣భି௣మఉభ௔భିఉమ௔మିఉభ௔భబାఉమ௔మబା௕భబି௕మబ.  (18) 
In Case 3 and Case 4, consumers with low ߠ use 
basic versions of two apps, and consumers with high ߠ 
purchase full versions of two apps. The difference 
between these two cases is that the basic version of app 
1 is favored by consumers with low ߠ in Case 3 but 
it’s favored by consumers with moderate ߠ in Case 4. 
In Case 3, setting ݑ௜ଵி௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଶி௔ , ݑ௜ଶி௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଵி௕  and 
ݑ௜ଵி௕ ൌ ݑ௜ଶி௕, the expressions of the indifferent points are 
 ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௘భௗೌభି௘మௗೌమା௘భௗ್భି௘మௗ್మ௔మି௔భ ,  (19) 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௘భௗೌభି௘మௗೌమା௘భௗ್భି௘మௗ್మି௣భఉభ௔భబିఉభ௔భା௔మି௕భబ ,  (20) 
 ߠ෨ଷ ൌ ௘భௗೌభି௘మௗೌమା௘భௗ್భି௘మௗ್మି௣భା௣మఉభ௔భబିఉమ௔మబିఉభ௔భାఉమ௔మି௕భబା௕మబ.  (21) 
In Case 4, the expressions of ߠ෨ଵ and ߠ෨ଷ could be 
computed with Equation (19) and Equation (21) . By 
setting ݑ௜ଵி௔ ൌ ݑ௜ଵி௕, the expressions of ߠ෨ଶ is 
 ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ௣భఉభ௔భିఉభ௔భబି௔భା௕భబ.  (22) 
Based on the above expressions of indifferent 
points, we can compute consumer demand and further 
find the equilibrium solutions. Due to the limitation of 
the space, we omit the specific expressions of prices, 
consumer demand and profit in equilibrium as well as 
corresponding conditions in subgame Case FF. 
 
3. Analysis 
 
Because the sub-game-perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the four cases derived in Section 2 is complicated, we 
resort to numerical methods to solve the 2 ൈ 2 payoff 
matrix to get the market equilibrium of the game. By 
setting ܽଵ଴ ൌ 0.2 , ܽଶ଴ ൌ 0.3 , 	݁ଵ ൌ 0.01 , ݁ଶ ൌ0.02 , 	ߚଵ ൌ 0.3  and ߚଶ ൌ 0.3 , we analyze the four 
equilibriums and explain how the quality of basic 
versions ܽଵ  and ܽଶ  impact market equilibrium 
solutions when the difference in consumers’ expected 
quality toward full versions of two apps is moderate 
(ܾଵ଴ ൌ 0.8 and ܾଶ଴ ൌ 1) in section 3.1-3.5, and we 
further analyze the impact of ܾଵ଴ and ܾଶ଴ on market 
equilibrium solutions in section 3.6. In section 3.7 and 
3.8, we examine how ݁ଵ , ݁ଶ , ߚଵ  and ߚଶ  affect 
profits of two app developers in four cases.  
3.1 Equilibrium PP 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 present equilibrium profits, 
prices and consumer demand for the four possible 
market configurations when ܽଵ  is large but ܽଶ  is 
small (ܽଵ ൌ 0.3 and ܽଶ ൌ 0.1).  
 
Table 3. The equilibrium profits for the four 
possible market configurations 
   App 2 
App 1 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Freemium 
strategy 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Πଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.011 Πଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.077 
Πଵ௉ி ൌ 0.005 Πଶ௉ி ൌ 0.053 
Freemium 
strategy 
Πଵி௉ ൌ 0.008 Πଶி௉ ൌ 0.064 
Πଵிி ൌ 0.004 Πଶிி ൌ 0.042 
 
Table 4. The equilibrium prices and demand 
under the four possible market configurations 
 Price Demand 
Case PP ݌ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.039 ݌ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.114 
݀ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.282 ݀ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.674 
Case FP ݌ଵி௉ ൌ 0.030 ݌ଶி௉ ൌ 0.095 
݀௔ଵி௉ ൌ 0.056,	݀௕ଵி௉ ൌ 0.267 ݀ଶி௉ ൌ 0.677 
Case PF ݌ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.022 ݌ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.076 
݀ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.251 ݀௔ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.049,	݀௕ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.701 
Case FF ݌ଵிி ൌ 0.015 ݌ଶிி ൌ 0.058 
݀௔ଵிி ൌ 0,	݀௕ଵிி ൌ 0.235 
݀௔ଶிி ൌ 0.039,	݀௕ଶிி ൌ 0.726 
 
Because ܽଶ ൏ ܽଶ଴, consumers’ expected quality of 
full version after trying the basic version is lower than 
that before trying the basic version. Thus, app 
developer 2 chooses pay-per-download strategy to 
avoid the decreases of consumers’ expected quality. In 
that way, app developer 2 can charge a much higher 
price. Although the consumer demand under 
pay-per-download strategy is slightly lower than that 
under freemium strategy, the app developer 2 can earn 
more profit under pay-per-download strategy.  
Because ܽଵ ൐ ܽଵ଴, consumers’ expected quality of 
full version increases after trying the basic version, 
which shrinks the difference in the quality of two apps 
and intensify competition. In order to moderate the 
competition, app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download 
strategy. Compared with adopting freemium strategy, 
when app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download 
strategy, he can charge a higher price and get more 
consumers to purchase the full version.  
Case PP is an equilibrium when ܽଵ is large but ܽଶ 
is small. In equilibrium, consumers with moderate 
quality preference buy app 1 and consumers with high 
quality preference buy app 2.  
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3.2 Equilibrium FP 
 
In Table 5 and Table 6, we present equilibrium 
results for the four possible market configurations 
when ܽଵ and ܽଶ are small (ܽଵ ൌ 0.1 and ܽଶ ൌ 0.2).  
 
Table 5. The equilibrium profits for the four 
possible market configurations 
   App 2 
App 1 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Freemium 
strategy 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Πଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.011 Πଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.077 
Πଵ௉ி ൌ 0.007 Πଶ௉ி ൌ 0.063 
Freemium 
strategy 
Πଵி௉ ൌ 0.012 Πଶி௉ ൌ 0.086 
Πଵிி ൌ 0.008 Πଶிி ൌ 0.073 
 
Table 6. The equilibrium prices and demand 
under the four possible market configurations 
 Price Demand 
Case PP ݌ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.039 ݌ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.114 
݀ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.282 ݀ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.674 
Case FP ݌ଵி௉ ൌ 0.043 ݌ଶி௉ ൌ 0.131 
݀௔ଵி௉ ൌ 0.064,	݀௕ଵி௉ ൌ 0.279 ݀ଶி௉ ൌ 0.657 
Case PF ݌ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.027 ݌ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.094 
݀ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.259 ݀௔ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.065,	݀௕ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.677 
Case FF ݌ଵிி ൌ 0.030 ݌ଶிி ൌ 0.109 
݀௔ଵிி ൌ 0,	݀௕ଵிி ൌ 0.256 
݀௔ଶிி ൌ 0.075,	݀௕ଶிி ൌ 0.67 
 
After trying the basic version of app 2 whose true 
value of the quality is lower than consumers’ prior 
belief (ܽଶ ൏ ܽଶ଴), users decrease their expected quality 
toward the full version of app 2. Although the app 
developer loses some consumers when he turns from 
freemium strategy to pay-per-download strategy, he 
can charge a higher price and earn more profit. Thus, 
app developer 2 adopts pay-per-download strategy.  
Because ܽଵ ൏ ܽଵ଴ , consumers decrease their 
expected quality of the full version of app 1 after trying 
the basic version. Consequently, consumers’ expected 
quality of the full version of app 1 under 
pay-per-download strategy is higher than the adjusted 
expected quality under freemium strategy. To moderate 
competition with app 2, app developer 1 adopts 
freemium strategy to lower consumers’ expected 
quality of his app. Compared with adopting 
pay-per-download strategy, app developer 1 adopting 
freemium strategy can charge a significantly higher 
price at the cost of losing few consumers, which brings 
more profit to the developers.  
Case FP is an equilibrium when  ܽଵ and ܽଶ are 
small. In equilibrium, consumers with low quality 
preference use basic version of app 1, and those with 
moderate quality preference buy full version of app 1, 
and those with high quality preference buy app 2. 
 
3.3 Equilibrium PF 
 
Table 7 and Table 8 present equilibrium results for 
the four possible market configurations when ܽଵ is 
small and ܽଶ is large (ܽଵ ൌ 0.1 and ܽଶ ൌ 0.6).  
 
Table 7. The equilibrium profits for the four 
possible market configurations 
   App 2 
App 1 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Freemium 
strategy 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Πଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.011 Πଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.077 
Πଵ௉ி ൌ 0.005 Πଶ௉ி ൌ 0.090 
Freemium 
strategy 
Πଵி௉ ൌ 0.012 Πଶி௉ ൌ 0.086 
Πଵிி ൌ 0.004 Πଶிி ൌ 0.096 
 
Table 8. The equilibrium prices and demand 
under the four possible market configurations 
 Price Demand 
Case PP ݌ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.039 ݌ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.114 
݀ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.282 ݀ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.674 
Case FP ݌ଵி௉ ൌ 0.043 ݌ଶி௉ ൌ 0.131 
݀௔ଵி௉ ൌ 0.064,	݀௕ଵி௉ ൌ 0.279 ݀ଶி௉ ൌ 0.657 
Case PF ݌ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.021 ݌ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.151 
݀ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.237 ݀௔ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.169,	݀௕ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.594 
Case FF ݌ଵிி ൌ 0.019 ݌ଶிி ൌ 0.165 
݀௔ଵிி ൌ 0,	݀௕ଵிி ൌ 0.230 ݀௔ଶிி ൌ 0.187,	݀௕ଶிி ൌ 0.584 
 
When the true value of quality for the basic version 
of app 2 is higher than consumers’ expected quality 
(ܽଶ ൐ ܽଶ଴), consumers increase their expected quality 
toward full version of app 2 after trying the basic 
version. Thus, app developer 2 can use freemium 
strategy to charge a higher price and earn a larger 
amount of revenue.  
As analyzed in section 3.2, when ܽଵ ൏ ܽଵ଴ , 
consumers’ expected quality toward full version of app 
1 decreases after trying the basic version. To moderate 
competition between high-quality free version of app 2 
and paid version of app 1, app developer 1 has to adopt 
pay-per-download strategy rather than freemium 
strategy to keep consumers’ expected quality toward 
full version as higher as possible. Under 
pay-per-download strategy, the app developer 1 can 
charge a higher price and also get more consumer 
demand.  
Case PF is an equilibrium when ܽଵ is small and ܽଶ is large. In equilibrium, consumers with low quality 
preference use basic version of app 2 for free, and 
consumers with moderate preference choose app 1, and 
consumers with high preference purchase full version 
of app 2.  
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3.4 Equilibrium FF 
 
Table 9 and Table 10 present equilibrium results for 
the four possible market configurations when ܽଵ and ܽଶ are large (ܽଵ ൌ 0.3 and ܽଶ ൌ 0.7).  
 
Table 9. The equilibrium profits for the four 
possible market configurations 
   App 2 
App 1 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Freemium 
strategy 
Pay-per-download 
strategy 
Πଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.011 Πଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.077 
Πଵ௉ி ൌ 0.002 Πଶ௉ி ൌ 0.092 
Freemium 
strategy 
Πଵி௉ ൌ 0.008 Πଶி௉ ൌ 0.064 
Πଵிி ൌ 0.003 Πଶிி ൌ 0.086 
 
Table 10. The equilibrium prices and demand 
under the four possible market configurations 
 Price Demand 
Case PP ݌ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.039 ݌ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.114 
݀ଵ௉௉ ൌ 0.282 ݀ଶ௉௉ ൌ 0.674 
Case FP ݌ଵி௉ ൌ 0.030 ݌ଶி௉ ൌ 0.095 
݀௔ଵி௉ ൌ 0.056,	݀௕ଵி௉ ൌ 0.267 ݀ଶி௉ ൌ 0.677 
Case PF ݌ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.009 ݌ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.159 
݀ଵ௉ி ൌ 0.194 ݀௔ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.231,	݀௕ଶ௉ி ൌ 0.575 
Case FF ݌ଵிி ൌ 0.013 ݌ଶிி ൌ 0.146 
݀௔ଵிி ൌ 0,	݀௕ଵிி ൌ 0.211 
݀௔ଶிி ൌ 0.202,	݀௕ଶிி ൌ 0.586 
 
Due to ܽଶ ൐ ܽଶ଴ , the app developer 2 adopts 
freemium strategy. Because consumers increase their 
expected quality toward full version of app 2 after 
trying the basic version, the app developer 2 can charge 
a higher price and earn more profit under freemium 
strategy.  
Because app developer 2 offers a free version of 
high quality, app developer 1 has to face an intensive 
competition from free version of app 2. To increase 
consumers’ expected quality of full version of app 1, 
app developer 1 adopts freemium strategy. In that way, 
app developer 1 can charge a higher price and also get 
more consumers.  
Case FF is an equilibrium when ܽଵ and ܽଶ are 
large. In equilibrium, no consumers use free version of 
app 1. Consumers with low quality preference choose 
free version of app 2, and consumers with moderate 
quality preference buy full version of app 1, and 
consumers with high quality preference purchase full 
version of app 2. 
 
3.5 Impact of ࢇ૚ 	 and	 ࢇ૛ 	 on	 Market 
equilibrium 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how quality of the basic 
versions ܽଵ and ܽଶ impact the strategy adopted by 
each app developer in equilibrium. We further 
summarize our observations in Results 1. 
Results 1. If  ܾଶ଴ ൐ ܾଵ଴  and the difference of ܾଵ଴ 
and ܾଶ଴ is moderate, market equilibria under different ሺܽଵ, ܽଶሻ are: 
i) Case FP is an equilibrium when ܽଵ is small and ܽଶ is small;  
ii) Case PF is an equilibrium when ܽଵ is small 
and ܽଶ  is large or when ܽଵ  is large and ܽଶ  is 
moderate;  
iii) Case PP is an equilibrium when ܽଵ is large 
and ܽଶ is small;  
iv) Case FF is an equilibrium when ܽଵ is small 
and ܽଶ is moderate or when ܽଵ is large and ܽଶ is 
large. 
 
	
Figure 4. Market equilibria in ࢇ૚-ࢇ૛ space 
Notes. Figure 4 is based on ܽଵ଴ ൌ 0.2, ܽଶ଴ ൌ 0.3,	ܾଵ଴ ൌ 0.8, ܾଶ଴ ൌ 1,	݁ଵ ൌ 0.01, ݁ଶ ൌ 0.02,	ߚଵ ൌ 0.3 and ߚଶ ൌ 0.3.  
 
App developer 2, who offers high-quality app, 
adopts pay-per-download strategy when ܽଶ is small, 
but he adopts freemium strategy when ܽଶ is large. If 
the true value of the quality ܽଶ is much higher than 
consumer’s expected quality ܽଶ଴, the app developer 
prefers to offer a basic version because consumers’ 
expected quality of the full version increases after they 
try the basic version. If ܽଶ is lower than ܽଶ଴, the app 
developer has no incentive to offer a basic version. 
Trying the basic version decreases consumers’ 
expected quality of the full version and reduces the 
profit of the app developer. If ܽଶ is slightly higher 
than ܽଶ଴, the app developer adopts pay-per-download 
strategy. Although offering the basic version can 
slightly increase consumers’ expected quality of the 
full version, it cannibalizes demand of the full version, 
which hurts the developer’s profit.  
When ܽଵ is small, where consumers decrease their 
expected quality of the full version after trying the 
basic version, we find that app developer 1 chooses 
freemium strategy when ܽଶ  is small-to-moderate. 
When ܽଵ is large, consumers’ expected quality of the 
full version increases after trying the basic version. 
However, app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download 
strategy rather than freemium strategy when ܽଶ  is 
small-to-moderate. The rationale behind these 
a 2
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counter-intuitive results is that the strategy adopted by 
app developer 1 helps to lower consumers’ expected 
quality of the full version and enlarge the difference in 
the quality of two apps, which reduces competition 
between two app developers and enable them to earn 
more profit.  
When ܽଶ is large, where app developer 2 adopts 
freemium strategy, app developer 1 will choose the 
strategy that can increase consumers’ expected quality 
of the full version to moderate competition against the 
free version of app 2. Therefore, app developer 1 
adopts pay-per-download strategy to avoid decrease of 
expected quality after trying the basic version when ܽଵ 
is small, and he adopts freemium strategy to increase 
consumers’ expected quality by offering free version 
when ܽଵ is large.  
 
3.6 Impact of ࢈૚૙ 	 and	 ࢈૛૙ 	 on	 Market 
equilibrium 
 
Figure 5 illustrate how consumers’ expected quality 
of the full versions ܾଵ଴  and ܾଶ଴  impact the 
equilibrium. We further summarize our observations in 
Results 2.  
  
(a) ܽଵ ൌ 0.1, ܽଶ ൌ 0.25 (b) ܽଵ ൌ 0.05, ܽଶ ൌ 0.5
  
(c) ܽଵ ൌ 0.4, ܽଶ ൌ 0.2 (d) ܽଵ ൌ 0.25, ܽଶ ൌ 0.6
Figure 5. Market equilibria in ࢈૚૙-࢈૛૙ space 
Notes. Figure 5 is based on ܽଵ଴ ൌ 0.2, ܽଶ଴ ൌ 0.3,݁ଵ ൌ 0.01, ݁ଶ ൌ 0.02,	ߚଵ ൌ 0.3 and ߚଶ ൌ 0.3.  
 
Results 2. When ܾଶ଴ ൐ ܾଵ଴, as the difference of ܾଵ଴ 
and ܾଶ଴ increases, the changes of market equilibria 
are:  
i) If ܽଵ and ܽଶ are small, the equilibrium changes 
from Case FP to Case PP;  
ii) If ܽଵ is small and ܽଶ is large, the equilibrium 
changes from Case FF, Case PF to Case FP and Case 
PP;  
iii) If ܽଵ is large and ܽଶ is small, the equilibrium 
is Case PP; 
iv) If ܽଵ  and ܽଶ  are large, the equilibrium 
changes from Case PF, Case FF to Case PP.  
When the true values of quality of basic versions 
are lower than consumers’ prior belief, app developer 2 
adopts pay-per-download strategy to avoid the decrease 
of consumers’ expected quality toward the full version. 
The response of app developer 1 depends on the 
difference of ܾଵ଴ and ܾଶ଴. When ܾଵ଴ is close to ܾଶ଴, 
app developer 1 uses freemium strategy to decrease 
consumers’ expected quality of the full version by 
offering the basic version for trial. In that way, the 
difference of consumers’ expected quality of two apps 
enlarges, which moderate the competition. When ܾଵ଴ 
is much lower than ܾଶ଴, the competition between the 
two apps is weak. Therefore, app developer 1 uses 
pay-per-download strategy to increase consumers’ 
expected quality and earn more profit.  
When ܽଵ is lower than ܽଵ଴ and ܽଶ is higher than ܽଶ଴, app developer 2 adopts freemium strategy when ܾଵ଴  is close to ܾଶ଴  but he uses pay-per-download 
strategy when ܾଵ଴  is much lower than ܾଶ଴ . In the 
former situations, faced with intensive competition, 
app developer 2 offers basic version to increase 
consumers’ expected quality of full version and get 
more consumers. In the latter situations, the 
competition between two apps is weak. App developer 
2 prefers to use pay-per-download strategy rather than 
freemium strategy to avoid cannibalization effect of the 
free version. As for the response of app developer 1, he 
uses freemium strategy to increase quality difference of 
two apps when ܾଵ଴  is higher, and he adopts 
pay-per-download strategy to charge a higher price 
when ܾଵ଴ is lower.  
When ܽଵ is higher than ܽଵ଴ and ܽଶ is lower than ܽଶ଴ , both app developers adopt pay-per-download 
strategy in equilibrium. Because ܽଶ ൏ ܽଶ଴ , app 
developer 2 has no incentive to offer the free version. 
Although ܽଵ ൐ ܽଵ଴ , to avoid causing intense 
competition against app 2 and cannibalizing demand of 
full version, app developer 1 doesn’t offer free version 
in equilibrium. That is, the best response of app 
developer 1 is to use pay-per-download strategy.  
When ܽଵ and ܽଶ are higher compared with ܽଵ଴ 
and ܽଶ଴, app developer 2 adopts freemium strategy to 
increase consumers’ expected quality toward full 
version if ܾଶ଴ is close to ܾଵ଴ where the competition 
is intense, while he uses pay-per-download strategy to 
avoid free version cannibalizing demand of full version 
if ܾଶ଴ is much higher than ܾଵ଴ where the competition 
is weak. Responding to pay-per-download strategy 
adopted by app developer 2, app developer 1 uses 
pay-per-download strategy which helps to moderate 
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competition and avoids cannibalizing effect of the free 
version. Responding to freemium strategy adopted by 
app developer 2, app developer 1 uses 
pay-per-download strategy when the difference of ܾଵ଴ 
and ܾଶ଴  is small, whereas he adopts freemium 
strategy when the difference of ܾଵ଴  and ܾଶ଴  is 
moderate. The rationale is as follows. Compared with 
adopting pay-per-download strategy, using freemium 
strategy increases consumers’ expected quality of the 
full version but shrinks the difference in expected 
quality of two apps. Therefore, freemium strategy will 
be used by app developer 1 only if the difference of 
ܾଵ଴ and ܾଶ଴ is not low.  
 
3.7 Impact of ࢋ૚	 and	 ࢋ૛	 on	Profits 
 
Figure 6 illustrates how the intensity of network 
effects ݁ଵ  and ݁ଶ  impacts the profits of app 
developers in four cases. Our observations are 
summarized in Results 3. 
 
  
(a) The change of profits with respect to ݁ଵ
  
(b) The change of profits with respect to ݁ଶ
Figure 6. The change of profits with respect to 
intensity of network effects 
Note: Figures are based on ܽଵ ൌ 0.3,	 ܽଶ ൌ 0.4,	ܽଵ଴ ൌ 0.2,	ܽଶ଴ ൌ 0.3,	ܾଵ଴ ൌ 0.8,	 ܾଶ଴ ൌ 1,		ߚଵ ൌ 0.3	 and	 ߚଶ ൌ 0.3.	݁ଶ ൌ 0.01	 for	Figure	6(a)	and	 ݁ଵ ൌ 0.01	 for	Figure	6(b).	
 
Results 3. The impact of network effect on profits of 
app developers is as follows:  
i) as the intensity of network effect of app 1 
increases, the profits of two app developers decrease; 
ii) as the intensity of network effect of app 2 
increases, the profit of app 1 decreases but the profit of 
app 2 increases.  
With the increase of the intensity of network effect 
of app 1, consumers’ valuation toward app 1 increases, 
which reduces the differentiation of two apps and 
intensifies the competition, thus both app developers 
lose profit. With the increase of the intensity of 
network effect of app 2, consumer’s valuation toward 
app 2 increases. The app developer 2 charges a lower 
price to attract a larger number of users, thus he earns 
more profit. Faced with the lower price charged by the 
competitor, the app developer 1 has to reduce his price 
but lose some users, thus his profit decreases.  
 
3.8 Impact of ࢼ૚	 and	 ࢼ૛	 on	Profits 
 
Figure 7 illustrates how the intensity of learning 
effect ߚଵ  and ߚଶ  impacts the profits of app 
developers in four cases. Our observations are 
summarized in Results 4. 
 
  
(a) The change of profits with respect to ߚଵ
  
(b) The change of profits with respect to ߚଶ
Figure 7. The change of profits with respect to 
intensity of learning effects 
Note: Figures are based on ܽଵ ൌ 0.3,	 ܽଶ ൌ 0.4,	ܽଵ଴ ൌ 0.2,	ܽଶ଴ ൌ 0.3,	ܾଵ଴ ൌ 0.8,	 ܾଶ଴ ൌ 1,		݁ଵ ൌ 0.01	 and	 ߚଶ ൌ 0.02.	ߚଶ ൌ 0.3	 for	Figure	7(a)	and	 ߚଵ ൌ 0.3	 for	Figure	7(b).	
 
Results 4. When consumers’ beliefs increase after free 
trials, the impact of learning effect on profits of app 
developers is as follows: 
i) as the intensity of learning effect of app 1 
increases, the profits of two app developers decrease; 
ii) as the intensity of learning effect of app 2 
increases, the profits of two app developers increase. 
In situations where consumers’ quality beliefs 
increase after free trials, as the intensity of learning 
effect of app 1 increases, consumers generate higher 
valuations toward the full version of app 1 when the 
free version is offered. The differentiation of apps 
created by two developers reduces, thus the two app 
developers decrease app prices, which hurt their profits. 
As the intensity of learning effect of app 2 increases, 
consumers generate higher valuations toward full 
version of app 2 when free version is offered. Thus, the 
differentiation of apps created by the two app 
developers increases, which enables the two app 
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developers to charge higher prices and earn more 
profits.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Motivated by practical examples in app market, we 
analyze how app developers choose revenue model in a 
duopoly setting. The two app developers offer 
vertically-differentiated apps and choose to adopt 
pay-per-download strategy or freemium strategy in the 
presence of network effect and experience-based 
learning effect.  
We find that when the difference in consumers’ 
expected quality of full versions of two apps is large, 
both app developers use pay-per-download strategy, 
otherwise each app developer may adopt either one of 
the strategies depending on specific conditions. When 
the difference in consumers’ expected quality of full 
versions of two apps is moderate, the developer 
offering high-quality app uses freemium strategy if true 
quality of the free version is much higher than 
consumers’ belief, otherwise he chooses 
pay-per-download strategy. However, the response of 
developer offering low-quality app can be totally 
conversed according to the relationship of consumer 
belief and true quality. When the competitor offering 
high-quality app uses pay-per-download strategy, the 
developer offering low-quality app chooses 
pay-per-download strategy if true quality of the free 
version is much higher than consumers’ belief, 
otherwise he chooses freemium strategy.  
Our findings show that the app developers in the 
market with intensive competition should adopt the 
strategy that can raise the differentiation between the 
products and reduce the competition. For example, if 
the consumers’ beliefs of two apps decrease after free 
trial, the app developer should adopt pay-per-download 
strategy when the users prefer his app but freemium 
strategy when the users prefer the app created by the 
competitor. The leader in the market only offers a full 
version to avoid the decrease of consumers’ belief after 
free trial. Responding to the action of the leader, the 
follower in the market augments the differentiation of 
the two apps and earns more profit by offering the free 
version to decrease consumers’ belief of his own app. 
In addition to the competition effect, the app developer 
should also consider the cannibalization effect. In 
situations where consumers’ beliefs of the apps 
increase after free trial, the leader can use 
pay-per-download strategy to maximize his profit when 
the difference in consumers’ beliefs of two apps is 
significant. Because of the weak competition, the 
developer mainly considers cannibalization effect and 
chooses to offer only the full version to avoid 
cannibalization of demands of two versions.  
Our analysis can be further extended in multiple 
ways. First, we assume that the quality of free version 
is exogenous, but the decision of quality can be 
considered to provide more guidelines on app design. 
Second, other than pay-per-download strategy and 
freemium strategy, in-app-purchase strategy and 
subscription strategy are also prevalent in app market, 
which are worth investigating in competition 
environment.  
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